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ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH QUARANTINES AND TAKINGS 
 
 
Animal and plant diseases are a continuing concern, not only because of the 
economic impact in particular commodity sectors, but because of the potential ability in 
some cases to impact human health, and in many cases, to impact the nation’s economic 
health.1  Animal diseases like bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “Mad Cow”),2 
avian influenza,3 monkeypox,4 or plant diseases and infestations like citrus canker,5 the 
Emerald Ash Borer,6 or Ralstonia7 pose threats beyond the American farming sector, and 
as a result, both federal and state agencies must act to prevent the importation8 and spread 
of these pests and diseases.  However, government’s ability to act is not unfettered; the 
Fifth Amendment’s9 takings provision must factor into decision making when 
government takes or destroys private property to prevent the spread of disease or 
infestations.  Nearly 100 years ago, the Supreme Court upheld a state’s efforts to care for 
the public health and welfare by requiring vaccinations of its citizens,10 and over 75 years 
ago, the Supreme Court found a state within its rights to require the destruction of host 
material that contributed to a disease impacting crops, without providing for 
compensation for losses.11 Though these cases seemed to provide fairly clear guidance of 
the police power to abate nuisances and combat animal and plant diseases without rising 
to the level of a taking, there have been some cases and instances where the opposite held 
true.  In some cases, using statutes speaking to compensation, both legislatures and courts 
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have placed requirements for compensation into disease programs.  This paper will look 
at an array of cases where the state’s powers to combat plant and animal diseases have 
been challenged, and will attempt to look at the impact that private property rights and 
takings jurisprudence may play in the new era where these kinds of diseases are not only 
a threat to the public or economic health, but also a component of national security. 
 
Miller v. Schoene, the Supreme Court’s say on the matter 
Cedar rust is a fungal disease of plants that requires two hosts: a member of the 
cypress family and a member of the rose family, which includes apple trees.12  Cedar 
apple rust alternates its life cycle between cedar trees and apple trees, causing unsightly 
but not lethal galls to form on the cedars, but causing leaf drop, fruit infection, and 
markings that can make a commercial apple crop unmarketable.13  The fungal spores can 
travel hundreds of yards on the wind, meaning that when the two host plants are near 
enough to each other and the fungus is present, treatment must be undertaken to keep the 
disease under control.14  Current recommended control options include the use of 
fungicides, the use of genetically resistant plant stock, and the removal of one of the two 
required host species.15 
Cedar rust has been an important economic disease of apples for many years.  In 
1914, the State of Virginia passed the Cedar Rust Act16 to help combat cedar rust and the 
impact it had on the state’s apple crop.17  The Act stated 
It shall hereafter be unlawful within this State for any person, firm or 
corporation to own, plant or keep alive and standing upon his or its 
premises, any red cedar tree, or trees (which are or may be) the source, 
harbor or host plant for the communicable plant disease commonly known 
as 'orange' or 'cedar rust' of the apple, and any such cedar trees, when 
growing within a radius of one mile of any apple orchard in this State, are 
hereby declared a public nuisance and shall be destroyed as hereinafter 
provided, and it shall be the duty of the owner or owners of any such cedar 
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trees to destroy the same as soon as they are directed to do so by the State 
entomologist, as hereinafter provided.18 
 
The act further required the state entomologist to make an inspection for the disease upon 
the request of land owners, to determine the presence and threat of the disease within two 
miles of an apple orchard, and if found, to notify the landowner of the requirement to 
destroy the infected host cedar trees.19  If the owner of the cedar trees did not destroy the 
cedar trees, the act authorized the state entomologist to do so.20  The Act did not provide 
for state compensation for the destroyed trees, or for the loss in property value caused by 
the destruction.21 
The Virginia Cedar Rust Act was put to the test not long after its adoption.  Miller 
and other plaintiffs found their ornamental cedar trees declared to be nuisances under the 
provisions of the Act, and sought to prevent the state entomologist from removing their 
trees, which were infected with cedar rust.22  The county circuit court upheld the state 
entomologist’s order but allowed the plaintiffs $100 for their expenses in removing the 
infected trees, and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.23  The 
plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming a taking under the due 
process clause, and the Court heard and decided the case in 1928.24 
The Court, after a review of the nature of the disease, noted that the red cedar was grown 
ornamentally, minimally for lumber uses, and that its value was “small as compared with 
that of the apple orchards of the state”25 and further that Virginia was “under the 
necessity of making a choice between the preservation of one class of property and that 
of the other wherever both existed in dangerous proximity.”26  The Court went on to say 
that “[w]hen forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by 
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in 
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the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.”27  The Court also 
determined that neither the Constitution nor the Virginia law required compensation for 
the trees, or for the diminution in value of the plaintiffs property.28  Further, that the 
statute did not violate the equal protection clause because it vested the decision making 
power in the state entomologist and not the surrounding landowners, and the act also 
contemplated sufficient hearings and appeals.29   
 
Miller v. Schoene, considered over time 
Miller v. Schoene has not been overruled since its issuance in 1928, and has 
become in the Supreme Court’s own words, part of  “a long line of this Court's cases 
sustaining against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges the State's use of its 
‘police powers’ to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances.”30  
Miller has been examined and cited in a number of well-known cases where the Supreme 
Court has looked at the issues surrounding private property, police power, and takings.  
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,31 Justice Scalia acknowledged Miller and 
the proposition that a public nuisance abatement need not necessarily require 
compensation while also noting that under the Court’s current understanding, “the 
legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing 
from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.”32  However, 
there is a key distinction between Miller and Lucas, that being noxious use or nuisance.  
In Lucas, the State of South Carolina passed a law and sought to prevent the owner of 
beachfront property from constructing residential dwellings on it, severely limiting the 
value of the property.33  Justice Scalia wrote,  
A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than 
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts--by 
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adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's 
law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to 
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.34  
 
Justice Scalia went on to note that the historical analysis using “harmful or noxious use” 
had evolved into a more modern theory that "land-use regulation does not effect a taking 
if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests'...."35 
The deprivation of the use of Lucas’ property by the state of South Carolina was 
under the state’s statute that included a legislative finding “[I]t is in both the public and 
private interests to protect the [beach/dune] system from this unwise development.”36  
The legislative findings of the risk of damage to private and public property, and the risk 
of danger to the environment were not alone sufficient to justify a taking without 
compensation, especially in an instance such as this, where a total taking had occurred, 
meaning the landowner had been deprived of most uses of the property.37  To avoid 
having to pay compensation, the state would have to demonstrate that it was using 
common law on nuisance to prevent the owner from using his property, because a "State, 
by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without 
compensation...."38 
Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Lucas cited Miller v. Schoene approvingly, 
quoting from it that “preferment of (the public interest) over the property interest of the 
individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics 
of every exercise of the police power which affects property.”39  
The Court also referenced Miller in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. 
DeBenedictis,40 where the State of Pennsylvania had passed a law requiring that mining 
companies to leave fifty percent of the coal in the ground helping ensure the stability of 
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the structures on the surface.  Though the Court was narrowly divided, both the opinion 
by Justice Stevens and the dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist mentioned Miller as a 
guide.  The majority opinion noted that in Miller “it was clear that the State's exercise of 
its police power to prevent the impending danger was justified, and did not require 
compensation.”41  While the dissent did not agree with the majority’s premise in the case 
that the Pennsylvania regulation was not a taking because "the character of the 
governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking”42 and the act 
“neither makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business, nor 
involves undue interference with [petitioners'] investment-backed expectations"43 the 
dissent did reference Miller and distinguish it as a different standard, because it did not 
involve the complete destruction of the cedar trees; the individual affected was able to 
use the trees.44  A key distinction for the dissent in Keystone seemed to be the loss of all 
use of the property.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:  
[O]ur cases have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete 
extinction of the value of a parcel of property. Though nuisance 
regulations have been sustained despite a substantial reduction in value, 
we have not accepted the proposition that the State may completely 
extinguish a property interest or prohibit all use without providing 
compensation.45 
 
Another key case in the area of takings analysis, Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v New York City,46 used Miller to illustrate that “a use restriction on real property may 
constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public 
purpose.”47 The Court found that New York’s zoning restrictions preventing construction 
in the airspace over the historic Grand Central Terminal were not a taking, because 
“while the challenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with 
interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant 
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to constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes.”48  States may impose 
restrictions through zoning on uses of land for the public’s quality of life and even 
aesthetics,49 and these zoning regulations that are “reasonably related to the promotion of 
the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, 
standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’”50 
While the dissent in Penn Central disagreed with the majority’s recognition of the 
City’s designations as legitimate zoning because the City’s landmark designations 
applied to individual buildings and not to particular areas, 51 and therefore imposed 
greater costs on select individuals than on a class of property, even requiring the property 
owners to expend money as a result of this designation as a public good,52 the Court 
differentiated Penn Central from earlier cases such as Miller, because Miller “involved 
noxious uses of property.”53  Using Miller as a reference, the dissent argued that “[t]he 
nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power 
itself. The question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or 
welfare of others.”54  In the Penn Central case, the city was not seeking to prohibit or 
control a nuisance.  It was seeking to preserve historic architecture, not by prohibiting 
some noxious or dangerous use, but instead by requiring affirmative duties through a 
form of eminent domain.55  Both the majority and the dissent recognized the ability of the 
state to abate noxious conditions or nuisances without being subjected to constitutional 
takings analysis. 
The Supreme Court has used Miller in other instances to support reasonable 
government regulation.  In a case involving claims to mining rights that were 
extinguished due to late filing claims, the Court cited Miller for the proposition that 
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“[r]egulation of property rights does not "take" private property when an individual's 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long as he 
complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions the legislature has imposed.”56  In a case 
claiming that a state law where mineral rights lapsed back to the state after a period of 
non-use was in effect a taking,57 the Court found that the overall benefit to the state far 
exceeded the minimal burden placed on the landowner, citing approvingly a portion of 
Miller: 
It will not do to say that the case is merely one of a conflict of two private 
interests and that the misfortune of apple growers may not be shifted to 
cedar owners by ordering the destruction of their property; for it is obvious 
that there may be, and that here there is, a preponderant public concern in 
the preservation of the one interest over the other.58 
 
Miller has been used to uphold classification distinctions made in the federal tax code  
“where the distinction between the class appropriately subject to classification and that 
not chosen for regulation is one of degree”59 and even in a discussion about compelling 
public interest in case involving the trial of a juvenile.60  In a railroad crossing case, the 
Court, citing Miller, noted “when particular individuals are singled out to bear the cost of 
advancing the public convenience, that imposition must bear some reasonable relation to 
the evils to be eradicated or the advantages to be secured.”61  Furthermore, a state “may 
prohibit the possession within its borders of the special instruments of violation, 
regardless of the time of acquisition or the protestations of lawful intentions on the part of 
a particular possessor”62 if it leads to the proper enforcement of its laws. 
 
Miller and its applications to other plants and animals 
Maryland Ferrets 
Miller was used in a 1996 Maryland case where a ferret had bitten a child.63  State 
regulations required the euthanasia of the ferret for rabies testing after a bite, and the 
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Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the state’s police power to destroy the ferret as within 
the state’s authority to protect the public health.64  The owners of the animal sought to 
have the destruction of the ferret declared a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  In this 
case, both the trial and the appeals courts found that the destruction of the ferret was a 
taking, albeit a legitimate one under the state’s police power.65  The court then attempted 
to determine if the taking was compensable, and using Lucas to analyze whether the 
entire value of the property had been destroyed by government action,66 the court found 
that 
We are convinced, therefore, that in a case such as this where the entire 
bundle of property rights has been destroyed, the Fifth Amendment 
requires compensation for the taking unless, as stated above, the 
government regulation does no more than prohibit or abate a public 
nuisance for which the property owner did not possess the right to use his 
property in the first place.67 
 
Therefore, even though the court found that the destruction of the ferret was a taking 
because it destroyed all value in the property, the state acted within its power because “a 
biting, wild animal represents a public nuisance due to the mere risk of infection it 
represents to humans. Without question, appellants are entitled to have a pet ferret. They 
are not, however, entitled to keep a ferret that represents a possible health risk.”68  Since 
the destruction of the ferret was necessary because of the nature of the test for rabies, it 
“merely denied appellants the right to use their property in an already prohibited manner, 
there was no compensable taking.”69 
California Peaches and Bees 
Two older California Supreme Court cases are also illustrative of the balance 
between nuisance and takings.  In a 1939 case, Skinner v. Coy, the county agricultural 
commissioner attempted to enter onto property to uproot and destroy a number of peach 
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trees infected with a disease cause peach mosaic.70  The disease harmed the trees, made 
the fruit unmarketable, spread easily, and could not be controlled by pesticides; burning 
of infected plant material was the recommended method of treatment.71  The Court 
upheld the power to destroy the trees, and rejected a claim that before destruction, each 
infected tree must be individually identified.72  Instead, “description of the premises as 
infected, with a specification of the existence of the infection in trees thereon is, in 
general, enough, without an attempt in the notice to designate every particular tree or 
plant in which the infection exists.”73  The California Supreme Court also found a state 
law requiring the inspection of apiaries or beehives and the destruction of infected 
apiaries to prevent the spread of bee diseases to be within the regulatory power of the 
state.74  The court rejected a claim that since the disease was not harmful to humans and 
only to bees, that the statute was invalid and also ruled that the state rationally found 
benefits to both the economy and the bee industry in maintaining healthy apiaries and 
eradicating disease.75  
Florida cattle 
The Supreme Court of Florida found that the state was within its bounds to enter 
onto farms to inspect, test, and destroy cattle infected with Bang’s disease.76  Bang’s 
disease, also known as brucellosis or undulant fever, is a disease known to cause 
abortions in cattle, and the disease can cause a number of maladies in humans.77  The 
disease was and is one of the most serious in cattle in the United States, and the economic 
consequences as well as the impact on the human population made the disease a target for 
national eradication beginning in 1934.78  Florida’s eradication program authorized the 
destruction of infected cattle to prevent the spread of the disease and offered 
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compensation as an inducement for cooperation with the program.79  However the court 
did not find that inducement compensation was required: 
Statutes authorizing destruction of property under such circumstances 
have usually provided compensation to the owner but on the theory of 
benevolence or that the community should help bear the loss and not in 
response to the doctrine of due process. Whether they provide 
compensation or not, they have been upheld.80   
 
The court went even further to conclude that summary destruction of diseased animals, 
without a due process hearing, might be necessary when “[I]n case of danger from 
epidemics among domestic animals from Bang's or other communicable diseases, it may 
be necessary to provide for summary abatement or destruction of diseased animals.”81  
Thirty years later, the issue was still being litigated, and the Florida Supreme Court again 
looked at brucellosis.  The eradication efforts for brucellosis/Bang’s disease were still 
underway, and a cattle farmer refused to comply with the state agriculture 
commissioner’s order to test his herd.82  The trial court ruled for the farmer, finding that 
the disease did not present an emergency because numbers of infected animals had not 
been increasing, and that the disease control program was not designed to protect the 
health or safety of the community and was instead an administrative program.83  Further, 
the trial court found that the test for the disease which resulted in a percentage of false 
positives, the process thereafter that required reactor animals be sent to slaughter within 
15 days, and the compensation program were all unconstitutional.84  The Florida Supreme 
Court found that the lower court’s reliance on previous cases involving the slow spread of 
a citrus plant disease were misplaced, and reversed the lower court.85  The Supreme 
Court, noting their decision thirty years prior and the findings of an ongoing threat to 
human health, also distinguished between plant and animal diseases.  
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Ordinarily, diseases affecting the health of persons or domestic animals 
are considered in law to be more malefic than diseases infesting or 
infecting plant life, and do not necessarily require a showing of their 
emergent or epidemic effects as a predicate compelling public interest for 
their summary eradication and control.86   
 
The court found the program continued to meet the rational basis test, and deferred to the 
fact finding role of the legislature, who “has found that brucellosis disease in domestic 
animals represents a dangerous subject of 'compelling public interest' sufficient to justify 
making an exception to the fundamental rule of due process or just compensation.”87  The 
court dismissed any idea that an emergency or epidemic must be rampant before a state 
may use summary proceedings to eradicate infectious or contagious diseases under its 
inherent police powers, and found the testing and eradication program, along with its 
compensation program, to be valid acts to protect the public.88 
Texas Cattle and Ticks 
In 1929, Texas’ Livestock Tick Eradication Act became effective.89  Tick Fever is 
caused by protozoa carried by ticks,90 and infected animals suffer from severe anemia as 
the protozoa attack the spleen and red corpuscles.91  Because this infection can result in 
up to 90% mortality, eradication of the tick became a priority,92 and with great effort the 
tick was eradicated from Texas.  However, Mexico still has a tick population, so the 
border counties remain under surveillance and treatment requirements that include 
regular treatment or “dips” with an acaracide to kill the ticks, or a vacating of the 
premises for the nine months of the tick’s life cycle.93  Texas law still requires owners of 
impacted livestock to dip, or run their animals through a tick-killing bath, or face 
prosecution.94 
Shortly after the 1929 Act, a rancher sued the Texas Livestock Sanitary 
Commission, arguing that the law was “arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of the 
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Constitutions of the state of Texas and of the United States”95 and that further, his cattle 
had acquired a certain level of immunity to the disease, so that treatment would make his 
cattle regain susceptibility.96  The rancher argued that the required expense of dipping, in 
addition to the potential loss of his animals’ immunity, would be a taking of his property 
without compensation.97  He also challenged the entire regulatory program as arbitrary, 
discriminatory, indefinite in its application, and without scientific basis.98   
The Texas court found that there was sufficient scientific basis for the treatment 
program, that the plaintiff’s cattle were infected and posed a risk to other cattle, and that 
the expense to livestock owners for treatment was slight, compared to the costs to the 
state’s industry as a whole.99  The court went on to find that the state legislature had clear 
authority under its police power to control and eliminate disease, including the forcible 
dipping of cattle, because “no question can now be raised as to that power anywhere, and 
especially not in Texas, where the Constitution itself provides for such power in the 
provision for the protection of livestock.”100  The court differentiated this state action 
from Miller because there was no destruction of property, 101 and further said that if the 
action was an isolated incident and resulted in a loss of tolerance for the disease, the 
owner might have a takings claim, but because his cattle were a “constant and active 
menace” to others, 102 he did not have a claim because  
[N]o vested right can be enjoyed in this state to maintain cattle hosts as 
carriers of disease, merely upon the ground that the hosts have themselves 
acquired a tolerance for the disease which they nurture, maintain, and act 
as a carrier for in its full menace and vigor just as much as if the hosts 
themselves were subject to the disease, for in a settled community it is the 
menace to others which the law prohibits, and no person can claim vested 
rights for himself in a condition which can exist only at the risk and 
expense of his neighbors.  It appears then to me that the Legislature, 
having full power to do so, has undertaken by a comprehensive scheme, a 
valid and constitutional purpose, to wit, to eradicate this fever-carrying 
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tick from the cattle of this state, and that all the provisions of the act are 
designed and measured to that end.103 
 
 
 
Minnesota Swine and Pseudorabies 
In an effort to eradicate the disease pseudorabies from swine and to comply with 
the federal pseudorabies program,104 the Minnesota Board of Animal Health established a 
quarantine program for the disease.105  Pseudorabies is a virus that kills piglets; older 
swine become carriers for life meaning that eradication requires destruction of the 
animals.106  Minnesota’s regulations107 prevented the movement of hogs from an infected 
herd to any destination other than slaughter, and this requirement caused disproportionate 
harm on hog farmers who raised breeding stock compared to those who raised hogs for 
slaughter, because of the higher relative value of breeding stock.108  An impacted farmer 
sued the state in Federal Court, claiming that the Minnesota regulations were "ineffective, 
discriminating, and non- protective” and “that the rules unconstitutionally take private 
property.”109  The court had little difficulty in analyzing the plaintiff’s claims that the 
quarantine of infected premises was beyond the state’s powers: “Unquestionably, the 
inherent police power of a state allows a state to establish quarantines to control disease 
in animals.”110  The court and the Animal Health Board acknowledged the 
disproportionate impact on some producers, but the Court, citing City of New Orleans v. 
Dukes111 and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,112 noted that classifications 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest are not violative of the equal protection 
clause.113  The court also cited Miller, finding that “[h]ere, the Board is not ordering the 
outright destruction of hogs, but Miller indicates that a state could do so without 
committing a taking.”114 Finally, the court noted that even if the Minnesota regulations 
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were not perfect, “[t]he fact that a regulation is not the best possible regulation, or that the 
regulation leaves much room for improvement are not  justifications for a court 
invalidating the regulation.”115 
 
Miller and Bird Flu—alternate analysis and results  
Avian Influenza is a disease that exists in multiple different strains and 
pathological levels.  It is found around the world, is endemic in wild bird populations, 
and can easily spread into domestic bird populations, like chickens.116  Most strains of the 
disease are classified as low pathogenic and while they cause relatively little severe 
damage in poultry, for producers, the economic impacts of even the low pathogenic 
strains can be significant due to quarantines and import bans from other countries.117  
However, high pathogenic variants exist, and the low pathogenic forms can mutate into 
higher and more dangerous forms.118  Highly pathogenic forms can strike without 
warning, spread quickly, and result in high mortality to domestic poultry.119  There are 
economic costs to the disease as well; USDA estimated that the highly pathogenic form 
of avian influenza that occurred in the Northeastern United States in 1983 and 1984 cost 
$65 million to eradicate and resulted in the destruction of 17 million birds.120  The highly 
pathogenic strain can be spread directly from bird to bird, or from bird through any 
contaminated source, including feed, cages, and people, and the virus can apparently live 
indefinitely in frozen manure, so disinfection of material is key to eradication during an 
outbreak.121  Both animal health officials and poultry producers express concern that the 
disease gets into domestic poultry populations through the contact between wild infected 
birds and the small producers of live birds destined for direct marketing, particularly in 
urban centers.122  The interaction in these live bird markets provides opportunity for 
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spread of the disease, and despite state precautions, both New York and New Jersey have 
reported regular incidents of avian influenza in the live bird markets.123 
An even more troubling concern with Avian Influenza occurred in 1997, when for 
the first time the disease was recorded as infecting humans, in Hong Kong.124  Since then, 
there have been several other human outbreaks of avian influenza, resulting in a number 
of deaths, particularly in Asia, from virulent strains, and health officials fear a new highly 
virulent strain could emerge and spread rapidly throughout the world’s human 
population.125  The World Health Organization recommends that in order to prevent a 
pandemic, quick action is necessary to prevent outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry 
from becoming epidemics and possibly mutating into forms that could infect humans.126  
Highly pathogenic strains of avian influenza have appeared again in Southeast Asia in 
late 2003-early 2004, causing human deaths.127  Low pathogenic forms of avian influenza 
have appeared in the United States in Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and a high 
pathogenic form in Texas since the beginning of 2004.128  In April of 2004, Canadian 
officials ordered the destruction of 19 million chickens, ducks, geese, and other poultry in 
British Columbia after province-ordered quarantines proved ineffective to prevent the 
spread, and the disease had spread to 18 farms and sickened two people.129    
Detection of avian influenza mobilizes both federal and state animal health 
officials: quarantines are issued to curtail movement of birds or potentially infected 
equipment; flocks are depopulated and premises disinfected; epidemiological 
investigations are begun to determine where the infection came from and where it might 
have spread to; surveillance and testing programs are established; and outreach and 
education campaigns are launched.130  Within five days of the outbreak in Maryland on 
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March 5, 2004, over 300,000 chickens had been destroyed.131  The strains of the disease 
in the eastern United States have been identified as low pathogenic and the strain in 
Texas as high pathogenic, but all strains differ from the high pathogenic Asian strain.132 
When a serious disease like avian influenza appears, threatening not only the economic 
health of the poultry industry but also the public health, government is called upon to act 
to prevent the spread and eradicate the disease through its use of the police power to 
impose quarantines and order destruction and decontamination of infected property.  
General tax dollars support the salaries and expenses of the veterinarians who are 
mobilized for these efforts, but who bears the cost for the chickens ordered destroyed?  A 
number of cases from the 1983-84 outbreak show how the courts decided. 
In Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell,133 a poultry processor appealed from 
summary judgment in favor of the USDA and Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture 
officials who had instituted a quarantine to prevent the spread of avian influenza.  A mild 
strain had been detected in Pennsylvania, and state and federal animal health officials 
began an eradication program, which became even more involved after the detection of a 
highly pathogenic strain.134  The court noted that “an eradication program was necessary 
to protect the poultry industry, valued at ten billion dollars with exports of one-half 
billion dollars per year, and to protect the best low-cost source of protein for the 
public”135 and that due to the nature of the disease, a negative test on one day did not 
necessarily mean a clean bill of health the next.  The USDA revised its regulations and 
quarantine restrictions a number of times as the disease spread and the eradication efforts 
evolved, and it greatly restricted movement of live poultry within a several county area, 
since there could be little assurance that healthy appearing birds did not in fact carry the 
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disease.136  Empire, a processor of kosher poultry products, brought suit when it was 
denied permission to move its healthy birds to a slaughter plant outside of the quarantine 
area.137  Shortly thereafter, an Empire owned flock in the quarantine area was diagnosed 
with avian influenza, and most of these birds were then destroyed pursuant to federal 
regulations,138 that provided for compensation.  The federal regulation139 provided for a 
“claim for payment for destruction of poultry, carcasses or parts thereof, eggs, products, 
or articles” and Empire received compensation for the destroyed chickens.  In addition to 
that claim, Empire sought reimbursement for its losses incurred during the quarantine, 
since it could not move its healthy birds to slaughter and was forced to purchase birds 
from other areas to fulfill its contractual obligations.140  USDA denied the claim because 
losses were not provided for in its regulations, other than those losses of poultry due to 
actual exposure or infection.141  Empire asserted that the quarantine that prevented it from 
moving its live chickens to processing was a taking that deprived it of property without 
compensation and without due process of law, and that further, that USDA’s 
compensation provisions denied Empire equal protection of the law because it treated 
some poultry owners differently than others.142  The district court granted summary 
judgment and Empire appealed. 
In addressing the substantive due process claim, the Third Circuit, citing 
Williamson v. Lee Optical,143 noted that the law or regulation need only identify an evil 
and a rational way to go about correcting it, and need not be perfectly or completely 
logical in its implementation.  The court rejected Empire’s claims that the quarantine, its 
geographic boundaries, and the movement restrictions were arbitrary or capricious, 
instead finding that the authorities’ actions were rational; therefore there was no violation 
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of Empire’s substantive due process rights.144  Empire’s argument that it was denied 
equal protection because the federal quarantine treated all birds in the quarantined zone, 
whether infected or healthy, similarly for the purposes of movement but only provided 
payment to some, was also dismissed by the court.  The court found that it was rational 
for the regulation to treat the two classes of property owners—those with infected and 
destroyed poultry, and those with healthy and non-destroyed poultry—differently.145  The 
court found a rational relationship between the classification and the government interest 
because  
The indemnity regulation was promulgated to encourage owners of 
infected or exposed poultry to destroy their birds, thereby reducing the 
spread of the disease. There was no need to encourage owners of 
noninfected and nonexposed birds to do likewise. Thus it was rational to 
indemnify the first group and not the second. Owners of noninfected or 
nonexposed birds were free to slaughter their birds or sell them to others 
for slaughter within the quarantined area.146   
 
Empire also argued that the federal regulations and action had been a taking of its 
property without compensation.  The Third Circuit looked for reference to the then 
recently decided Keystone Bituminous, where it was “clear that to prevail on a regulatory 
taking claim, a claimant must establish both that the governmental action falls outside the 
traditional police power, and that the governmental action sufficiently interferes with 
investment-based expectations.147  Recognizing Keystone’s reaffirmation of Miller, the 
court found that the regulation easily met the first part of the test, as “Miller v. Schoene 
suggests that a government could even require the slaughter of infected poultry without 
compensation, although in this case it did not do so.”148  The Court went on to find that 
“[p]lainly, while the regulations at issue here limited Empire's use of its property, they 
did not deprive Empire of all uses or of all value of the property. Such a quarantine 
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cannot be considered a taking.”149  The court rejected Empire’s second part of the test, 
that it had a loss of investment based expectations, primarily on the facts of the case 
because of Empire’s own actions, including closing one of its own processing plants in 
the quarantine area that could have slaughtered the chickens.150  The Third Circuit upheld 
the lower court’s summary judgment ruling for USDA and the state department of 
agriculture on the due process, equal protection, and taking claims.151 
Another case originating from the avian influenza outbreak reached a very 
different conclusion.  The Yancey v. United States152 case involved turkey farmers who 
were quarantined after avian influenza was traced from Pennsylvania to their county in 
Virginia.153  USDA implemented a quarantine of the area that applied to the Yancey 
farm, prohibiting the movement of live birds, manure, litter, and equipment, and issued 
compensation regulations “authorizing payment of up to 100% of the expenses of 
purchase, destruction and disposition of animals and materials required to be destroyed 
because of being contaminated by or exposed to lethal avian influenza.”154  The Yanceys’ 
flock never tested positive for avian influenza, and during the quarantine, the turkeys 
reached maturity but they could not be sold for their purpose as breeding stock.155  With 
maintenance costs for the healthy flock approaching $1,800 per week, the Yanceys 
decided it would be uneconomical to wait for the uncertain end of the quarantine, and 
they sold the turkeys for slaughter at a loss.156  The Yanceys then filed a claim for 
indemnity for $63,556, which USDA denied, because the turkeys had been healthy.157 
The Yanceys filed suit, and the Court of Claims found that because the turkeys were 
healthy and were not ordered to be destroyed by the government, and that the turkeys 
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were slaughtered for economic, not health reasons, that therefore, the turkeys were not 
destroyed for purposes of the regulation and no indemnity compensation was required.158 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found differently, however.  The court read 
the applicable section of the U.S. Code159 to cover the situation, in that the “Secretary of 
Agriculture . . . is authorized to control and eradicate any communicable diseases of 
livestock or poultry . . . including the payment of claims growing out of the destruction of 
animals (including poultry)” to mean that any costs linked to any destruction of poultry 
during the eradication of any disease should be covered by the USDA.160  The court 
relied on a case where the USDA paid indemnity for cattle that tested positive for 
tuberculosis, and then also paid indemnity for the remaining cattle in that herd that had 
not tested positive for the disease161 to suggest that even though the Yanceys’ flock had 
not been diseased, it might have been, making the government’s refusal to pay indemnity 
possibly arbitrary and capricious.162  The court found the government’s position of not 
paying indemnity for healthy animals could lead to “a perverse incentive to allow 
infection of their flocks in order to receive indemnities” and “contrary to Congress’ clear 
intent to promote cooperation with quarantine provisions.”163  Congress created the 
indemnity program, the court reasoned, to promote cooperation with the program, but 
since there was an absence of any evidence that Congress meant for USDA to exclude 
expending indemnity dollars on healthy animals,164 the court found that the Yanceys had 
a valid takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.  Acknowledging and quickly 
distinguishing Keystone Bituminous because that case involved a facial challenge to a 
regulation and not an economic impact analysis,165 and choosing to ignore Empire 
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because “we find it inconsistent with the intent of the Fifth Amendment”166 the court 
never referenced Miller.  The court summarized the issue with the following statement: 
When adverse economic impact and unanticipated deprivation of an 
investment backed interest are suffered, as when the poultry quarantine 
forced the Yanceys to sell their turkey flock, compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment is appropriate. Even when pursuing the public good, as the 
USDA was doing when it imposed the poultry quarantine, the Government 
does not operate in a vacuum. Bluntly stated, the consequences of the 
Government's action cannot be ignored. Why should the Yanceys be 
forced to bear their own losses when their turkeys were not diseased? The 
Yanceys' losses came about because of the Government's action. If the 
intent of the poultry quarantine was to benefit the public, the public should 
be responsible for the Yanceys' losses.167 
 
From that blanket statement, seemingly contrary to established jurisprudence on the 
police power to combat infectious and noxious diseases, the court moved on to damages, 
and acknowledged that the Supreme Court does not allow for lost profits under the Fifth 
Amendment168 but then decided that in this case that “the fair market value of property 
under the Fifth Amendment can include an assessment of the property's capacity to 
produce future income”169 and remanded the case for determination of the appropriate 
amount of compensation. 
However, another avian influenza case in the Court of Claims is more in line with 
the other cases on the takings issue.  In Wright v. United States,170 which was primarily a 
dispute over the amount of compensation offered for the indemnification of diseased 
poultry and damage done to facilities during the disinfection efforts, did also feature a 
look at the takings issue, summarizing  
Plaintiffs also asserted an unlawful fifth amendment taking for which just 
compensation is required. However, when acting under the state police 
power the destruction of diseased animals requires no compensation.  The 
basic reasoning used by the courts in support of this exercise of police 
power without compensation is that such diseased animals are obnoxious 
to the public health. Where public interest is involved, preferment of that 
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interest over the property interest of the individual, even to the extent of its 
destruction, is not unconstitutional. This court agrees with the rationale in 
Loftin that "[t]he diseased animals in this case can reasonably be 
considered a public nuisance. It follows then that no compensation for the 
destruction of these animals was required. However, Congress acting 
under the commerce clause in passing essentially a police regulation saw 
fit to compensate owners...." Therefore, under the authority of Miller and 
Loftin and on the facts of this case, a fifth amendment taking claim does 
not lie.171  
 
 
Florida and Citrus Canker—a more expensive eradication 
One other agricultural issue involving the government’s ability to control disease 
has played a significant role recently in both the courts and the media—citrus canker.172  
Citrus canker is a disease that does not affect humans, but does impact citrus trees, 
causing leaves and fruit to drop prematurely and leaving remaining fruit with unsightly 
and unmarketable cankers.173  The bacteria are carried by wind and rain, spreading 
quickly; Florida eradicated the disease in the first half of the 20th century, only to find it 
reemerge in the 1990’s.174  In Florida alone, citrus is valued as a $9 billion industry, 
employing 100,000 people and significantly contributing to the tourism economy as 
well.175  The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, recognizing the 
impact to the state’s economy of both the disease and the potential impact of a federal 
quarantine preventing citrus products from leaving the state if the disease was left 
unchecked, implemented an eradication program.176  Initially under the program, the state 
destroyed all citrus trees within a 125-foot radius of any infected tree.177  However, the 
disease continued to spread, and after bringing together a scientific panel to review the 
program, the state implemented the panel’s recommendation to remove all citrus within 
1,900 feet of an infected tree.178  A number of plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the action 
based on constitutional, administrative, and scientific grounds.179  There were legislative 
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changes to the state’s acts180 and numerous lawsuits, rulings, and declaratory judgments, 
including findings that the state’s laws violated the Fourth Amendment’s unreasonable 
searches and seizures provision and the Fifth Amendment’s takings provision.181  The 
Florida Legislature amended the laws in response to some of the state court’s rulings and 
specifically included a compensation provision: 
The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services shall provide 
compensation to eligible homeowners whose citrus trees have been 
removed under a citrus canker eradication program. Funds to pay this 
compensation may be derived from both state and federal matching 
sources and shall be specifically appropriated by law. Eligible 
homeowners shall be compensated subject to the availability of 
appropriated funds.182 
 
In its 2004 decision, the Florida Supreme Court examined the amended Florida statutes 
and their constitutional challenges, and began by contrasting the state’s power under 
eminent domain and the police power, finding that  
[a]lthough both powers impact on private property, there is a distinction 
between the power of eminent domain and the police power: [T]he former 
involves the taking of property because of its need for the public use while 
the latter involves the regulation of such property to prevent its use thereof 
in a manner that is detrimental to the public interest.183 
 
The Florida Supreme Court found that the program was a valid use of the state’s 
police power and targeted to meet a rational goal, but that under Florida law, when an 
individual’s property is destroyed for the greater good, there must be an indemnity 
provision, unless the action is undertaken as part of an emergency action.184  In order to 
meet the emergency test “in a total destruction of property without compensation, the 
statute must be justified by the narrowest limits of actual necessity and the threat must be 
imminently dangerous."185  Since citrus canker is a plant disease and not an infectious 
animal or human disease, the court seemed to feel that it would not meet the necessity or 
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dangerousness tests.186  Ultimately, the Florida court found that the destruction of healthy 
trees within the 1,900 foot radius of an infected tree was a valid use of the police power, 
and that the state’s compensation law was required, along with a cap, but not a ceiling to 
pay for losses.187  Further, the state was required to get a search warrant for each 
individual property.188 
Trees in Texas 
A citrus canker cases in another state also proved to be less than clear in exercise 
of the state police power.  In an early Texas case,189 predating Miller, the Texas Supreme 
Court found that the state’s agriculture commissioner did not have the authority to 
declare a citrus hedge infected with canker to be a public nuisance, because the state 
legislature had not specifically made the determination that citrus canker was a public 
nuisance and it lacked the authority to grant that power to the commissioner.190  Further, 
in a separation of powers argument, the court found that barring an emergency, the 
commissioner could not undertake an eradication like this without judicial approval, 
because otherwise “all property would be at the uncontrolled will of temporary 
administrative authorities, exercising, not judicial powers, but purely executive powers. 
The result would be to subject the citizen's property solely to executive authority.”191 
Trees in Kansas and Washington—Back to Miller 
This constitutional separation of powers reasoning was not supported however in 
a similar plant pest statute in Kansas, where the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the 
legislature’s creation of an Entomological Commission and the vesting of it with the 
authority to declare nuisances and take action to abate them.192  In that case, the 
Commission, having found a property infested with San Jose scale, an insect that 
damages apples, peaches, plums, and pears,193 took action and the court found the act an 
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acceptable authorization and delegation of the police power to the executive and the 
Commission’s actions an appropriate action to protect the public.194  Furthermore, the 
Kansas court found that compensation was not required if the legislature had not 
provided for it as part of the disease management program, in part because of the 
negligible value of infected or infested property.195  An early Washington state case 
found the same result; destruction of infested apples in order to protect the industry as a 
whole did not create a cause for damages since the diseased apples had no value.196 
A much more recent case from Washington state reviewed both the state’s 
authority to enter property to combat pest infestations and the takings provisions.197  
Citrus longhorned beetles were inadvertently imported into the United States from Korea, 
and escaped from a nursery.198  The beetles posed a very significant threat because with 
no natural predators, officials feared that the population could explode resulting in the 
destruction of uncountable numbers of trees.199  After detection of the beetles’ escape, 
state and federal officials formed a science advisory panel, which determined the level of 
threat to the natural ecosystems and found that because of the insect’s biology, the only 
effective method to eradicate the beetle was to destroy host tree material.200  The 
eradication plan called for removal of all potential host trees within 1/8 mile, and 
insecticide use and surveillance beyond that boundary.201  Homeowners objected to this 
plan, and were not mollified by state funding for vouchers to purchase replacement 
plants, feeling that their fruit and flowering trees, roses, and other plants should be 
purchased by the state before their removal.202  The superior court allowed the state to go 
forward, but found that the destruction was a compensable taking; the state appealed.203  
The Washington Court of Appeals, under the theory of necessity to abate an emergency, 
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and quoting Keystone Bituminous204 for its provisions on not compensating a property 
owner when abating a noxious use, 205 found that “[t]he destruction of the ornamental 
trees in this case is a consequence incidental to a valid regulatory measure, one taken for 
the purpose of defending against an impending public peril” and analogous to the 
situation in Miller v. Schoene.206  The plaintiffs attempted to use Miller to argue that 
destruction of healthy trees required compensation, but the court disagreed, noting that 
the plantiffs “fail to recognize that the statute upheld by the [Supreme] court permitted 
destruction of healthy trees (any red cedar tree "which is or may be " the host plant).”207  
The court also rejected an effort to use Florida cases to show that destruction of healthy 
trees must be compensated, finding that the fact-specific inquiry in the Florida citrus 
canker cases was not contrary with Miller, and summarized this area of law by saying 
“[t]rees as yet unaffected by disease may be destroyed without compensation, when 
evidence in the record shows that their proximity to a source of infestation renders them 
‘unhealthy’ as a matter of law and a source of imminent public danger.”208  The court 
reversed the judgment for compensation and concluded the destruction of trees was not a 
compensable taking.209 
 
Conclusion 
What then is a state or federal animal and plant health official to make of these 
decisions?  Or a lawmaker, for that matter?  The impact of a quarantine alone can have a 
significant economic cost to producers, even if no destruction is ordered and the 
quarantine is eventually lifted.  Most of the cases, stretching back to Miller, recognize 
that in order to prevent the spread of disease and to protect the greater public good, there 
are times when the property of the individual will be sacrificed.  Miller still appears to 
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stand for the proposition that the state may act, “by deciding upon the destruction of one 
class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of 
greater value to the public.”210  If the legislature chooses to make that judgment, and then, 
whether as a practical matter to help encourage public cooperation with the effort or as a 
response to political pressure adopts a compensation or indemnity plan is secondary—a 
political decision and not required constitutionally.  Most courts have relied on traditional 
nuisance and noxious property theory, and used that analysis to then determine whether 
there was a taking, compensable or not.  Some courts seem to draw a line distinguishing 
animal diseases that can spread to humans, especially those creating potential public 
health emergencies, from plant diseases that are primarily economic in their destruction.  
Diseases that can pass from animals to humans also raise the complicated issue of 
possible quarantines of infected or even suspected human populations, most recently 
brought to focus in the tracking of SARS and quarantines imposed on infected people in 
China and Canada.211  Fears of possible impact on human health require federal and state 
animals health officials to act to protect the public health and move quickly as disease 
outbreaks occur, but the possibility that their actions to prevent the spread of disease 
might result in a costly takings case could result in an overly cautious approach.   
The possibility of an intentional release of an infectious plant or animal disease as part of 
a bioterrorism event has raised the importance of disease detection and quarantines to 
even higher levels.  The U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Homeland Security have 
elevated the concept of biosecurity for agricultural producers and have stepped up efforts 
to inspect products and people entering the United States in order to prevent the 
intentional, as well as the unintentional importation of pests and diseases.212  Training of 
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private practice veterinarians to recognize foreign animal diseases, increasing laboratory 
detection capabilities, and training for emergency management situations have all been 
part of the preparedness response,213 as has been the call for improved coordination 
among federal and state agencies,214 and updating of laws to improve responses to 
outbreaks.  In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Center for Law and the 
Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities issued the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act for the CDC to assist the nation’s governors and 
legislatures in updating and reviewing their authorities and abilities to respond to 
emergencies, especially those caused by bioterrorism or epidemics.215  The act would vest 
broad emergency powers in governors, in order to “prevent, detect, manage, and contain 
emergency health threats”216 but also attempts to address potential conflicts between 
emergency management and civil liberties.  Regarding takings and compensation, section 
805 of the proposed Act provides that “compensation for property shall be made only if 
private property is lawfully taken or appropriated by a public health authority for its 
temporary or permanent use during a state of public health emergency declared by the 
Governor pursuant to this Act.”217  This language, and even more directly, proposed 
section 506, which reads “[c]ompensation shall not be provided for facilities or materials 
that are closed, evacuated, decontaminated, or destroyed when there is reasonable cause 
to believe that they may endanger the public health”218 would seem to indicate that in a 
disease outbreak of great enough significance that the Governor of a state declared a state 
of emergency, then there would be little to chance of compensation for the destruction of 
animals or plant material, even if the animals or plants turned out to not be infected.  The 
imposition of a quarantine would similarly seem to not provide for any compensation for 
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economic losses.   However, the proposed Act has been resoundingly criticized by a wide 
spectrum of sources, including civil liberty organizations and private property proponents 
as a “threat to individual rights”219 and that it “fails to include basic checks and balances, 
goes well beyond bioterrorism and lacks privacy protection.”220  Other commentators 
have argued that these revisions are not necessary because courts have traditionally 
upheld public health laws where there was a rational relationship between the 
government’s actions and the potential threat, as in Miller and its progeny.221   
With the passing of the initial sense of urgency after the September 11th attacks, it 
is appropriate for federal and state officials to review their authorities to contain and 
combat animal and plant diseases, whether occurring naturally or intentionally.  This 
authority should be reviewed in preparation not only for the next disease or emerging 
pathogen, but also for ongoing animal and plant diseases.  When telling the public, 
especially the citizens whose property is affected, that eradication or treatment efforts are 
about to take place, officials should expect public and legal challenges not only to their 
ministerial actions, but to their overarching authority to act.  As a result, preparation of 
supporting documentation including relevant state law as well as federal constitutional 
background is necessary.  Officials should also work with their legislatures to update 
provisions if necessary, providing clear guidance about the situations where 
compensation will be required and where it will not. 
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